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Abstract 
This study aims to interpret public aspiration fundin 
local budgeting in narcissism perspective. Discourse about 
"public aspiration fund”is a reality in budgeting leading to 
a contradiction, so the question is whether" public 
aspiration fund" that shows the reality in which the amount 
of funds used for realizing programs or activities in local 
government expressespublic needs and aspiration or 
contains another meaning related to personal interest and 
certain group interest. 
The research results provide an understanding that 
local budgets have potential to accentuate the "hall of 
mirrors". Public aspiration funds were created bybudgeting 
actors to express their identity as "the representatives" and 
to entrust the management to bureaucrats to "serve" public 
interests. However, in reality, the public aspiration funds 
have been part of an effort to serve their interests. The 
public aspiration fundhas become a simulacrumthat 
produces allthe fake deviated from the reference and create 
a mark as a mask, camouflage, or a mirage. 
 
Keywords: narcissism, budgeting, public aspiration funds, 
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Prologue: Narcissism, "I Love Me" 
The term ‘narcissism’ was first used in psychology by Sigmund 
Freud to take the figures of Narcissus in the Greek myth. Narcissus was a 
young man who was predicted to live a long life. However, Narcissus 
had angered the gods for refusing love of Echo. As he was bending to 
drink water in a pool, Narcissus saw himself in the water and instantly 
felt in love with himself. Every time he grasped the picture, it disappears. 
He sat and cried at the pool for days, he was not able to embrace the love 
of himself (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2006). That is why, the word 
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‘narcissistic’ describes a person who is too self-esteem, over-confident. 
Narcissistic was very egocentric and attention seeker. 
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At the social level, a narcissistic person is a skillful manipulator 
to trigger and utilize narcissistic impulse to the people around them. 
Narcissism is the attitude of individual in maintaining and improving the 
high valuation on him. (Campbell et al., 2004). Narcissists tend to be 
cruel, lack of empathy and persuasive rationalization for belief system 
(Lutus, 2007). Chatterjee and Hambrick (2006)conclude that narcissism 
is a matter that leads a person to assume positions, power, and influence 
(Kernberg, 1975). Moreover, narcissism is closely related to self-esteem, 
helping people in their professional progress (Raskin et al., 1991). 
Narcissistic culprit tends to perform high self-appraisal, good 
intelligence, creativity, competence, and ability to lead (John and Robins, 
1994). Therefore, narcissism makes people try to create a positive image 
which can give rise to optimism and strong belief on the results they will 
obtain.  
Christopher Lasch in ‘the culture of narcissism’saw that the 
existence of this narcissism is very dangerous(Lasch, 1979). Narcissism 
celebrates the surface culture of narcissism rather than thesubstance of 
culture. They used face rationality, artificial popularity, and so forth. 
Narcissism Deniesthe substance of culture. Perceptions about the "I" 
experience such hyperbole and grind to exhausted the perception of 
"you" that is not "me". Thus, the perception of "us" became critical and 
problematic, not to say it becomesnil (Rachman, 2009). 
In political context, political behaviors that engross with one-self 
refer tothe behavior of political narcissism, Piliang (2009). The existence 
of this political narcissism is certainly dangerous, because it performs 
more on ‘face’ popularityrather than the rational and substantial things. 
Some political phenomenon in regentand legislative electionindicate that 
society has actually been saturated with "face" politic which tends to be 
narcissistic. People prefer face to face rather than treated to great photos 
and "political appointments". Few days before the election of legislative 
candidates, regent, and president, political speeches can be seen in 
various events to attract the sympathy of voters. Political billboards of 
giant photo with a "narcissistic" smile, political jargon, acronyms that are 
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elusive in grammar, are found along the road. The theme always relates 
to"the favor of people". However, those are only mantraps to be elected, 
because after that they were all busy with the political deal while making 
bigger political plans  
 
Tracing the Public Aspirations Fund 
Aspiration fund is the popular name for a budget policy that once 
championed by Golkar Party for the reason of acceleratingthe 
development in electoral districts of the members of House of 
Representatives (DPR) with the fund proposed reachedRp15 billionfor 
each electoral district or Rp 8.4 trillion per year. Of course, this raises the 
"furor" because of the polemic caused. At a meeting ofbargeting council 
of DPR in discussing about the framework of the preliminary drafting of 
State Budget (RAPBN) in 2011, Jakarta,the proposal was set to be 
officially proposed, but some factions in the House of Representatives 
(DPR) rejected the proposal. However, later the name becomes the 
program of acceleration and equalization of regional development 
through the regional development policy of constituentcy base. The funds 
are included in Working Committee report notes of the policy of Central 
Government Expenditure Budget Agency (Kompas, 06/04/2010). 
The proposal of aspiration funds was rejected because the fund 
aspiration referred to as "pork barrel" that is prone to corruption or 
simply meet politicians’ piggy bank. The term ‘pork barrel’refers to 
spending managed by politicians or parliamentarian to their constituents 
in exchange for political support, either in the form of a campaign or vote 
in elections. The goal is that they can be re-elected in the next election. 
This political practice is constantly criticized because it tends to favor 
private interests rather than public interests as well as prone to fraud and 
misdirected. On one occasion the dialogue which was broadcastedon live 
on SUN TV dated June 16, 2010, 20:00 pm 
(www.benhan8.wordpress.com), Benny Handoko argues: 
Allocation of fund aspiration of Parliament will collide with the 
controlling function of Parliament on budget implementation. An 
example was the implementation of pork barrel in Philippines 
budgeting 60 million pesos per Congressman (or equivalent of 
Rp15 billion) with an impact on executive and legislature that do 
not control one to another, you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours 
(the term for mutual aid or collusion). The consequence was the 
mark-ups and corruption in pork barrel projects. The practice of 
executive-legislative collusion could occur and an example of the 
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kickback from the contractor that ultimately declinesthe quality of 
projects and the people are disadvantaged. 
 
According to Noda (2011), pork barrel is one of primitive forms 
emerged in Philippines in 1922 when the Public Works Act was 
approved. Since 1950, Congress was allowed to determine which projects 
will be funded under the Act, and from 1955 legislative projects were 
sponsored and separated from all the other items with the name 
"community projects". Finally, the project was further subdivided into 
"nationwide selected projects" set by Congress, and determined by 
Senator. Along the Marcos regime, the main arena for the funding of 
pork barrel was allocation of funds for multi-years infrastructure projects 
on public works projects under the Act set aside from the rest of national 
budget.To organize the fund, the Congress has the complete freedom to 
change the proposal of President or even impose a new, larger allocation. 
Due to the allocation of public works are multi-years, and because not all 
parts of the allocation that comes out of Congress were supported by the 
available funds, then conducted accumulation of projects which were 
implemented from three years earlier. After democratization in 1986, 
pork barrel was eventually incorporated into the general budget. This can 
increase the transparency of budget system. Although pork barrel did not 
longer exist, they use various forms of expenditure in general budget and 
thus become more visible. 
In Indonesia, The practice of pork barrel in Indonesia is more or less 
the same as the pork barrel in the Philippines, where the aspiration funds 
or social aids for people are allocated to a particular project or program. 
Pork barrel is basically a series of budget politicization chain by 
legislature. This practice has a correlation in the election cycle and fiscal 
policy. Macro-economic assumptions such as; fuel prices, inflation, and 
economic growth is always used to make pork barrel program be 
realistic. Politicians want to create a good impression to the voters that 
the pork barrel is issued to support the economy stability. Pork barrel is 
considered as an act of generosity from governments (Farhan, 2013). 
Thus, their practice was later developed into image political in which 
the politician is understood as a savior of society. Research into the pork 
barrel as a political budget cycle was introduced by Rogoff (1990), later 
then developed by Shi and Sevensson (2002). According to Rogoff 
(1990), political budget cycles are shown in budget posture, increasing 
spending, and unusual transfers. This budget distortion may occur 
because politician wanted to show himself as a good politician who 
always works hard for the benefit of society. Therefore, asymmetry 
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information has made a paradoxical effect where politicians get the 
political support about the pork barrel.Meanwhile this practice has 
harmful effects on the budget allocation for political interest. 
Aspiration fund is the popular name for a budget policy that once 
championed by Golkar Party for the reason of accelerating the 
development in electoral districts of the members of House of 
Representatives (DPR) with the fund proposed reached Rp 15 billion for 
each electoral district or Rp 8.4 trillion per year. Of course, this raises the 
"furor" because of the polemic caused. At a meeting of bargeting council 
of DPR in discussing about the framework of the preliminary drafting of 
State Budget (RAPBN) in 2011, Jakarta, the proposal was set to be 
officially proposed, but some factions in the House of Representatives 
(DPR) rejected the proposal. However, later the name becomes the 
program of acceleration and equalization of regional development 
through the regional development policy of constituentcy base. The funds 
are included in Working Committee report notes of the policy of Central 
Government Expenditure Budget Agency (Kompas, 06/04/2010). 
Although the aspiration fund that has been altered by 
nomenclature of acceleration and equalization program of regional 
development through regional development policy of constituentcy 
basehas been officially proposed by members of Parliament, but it seems 
precisely the "spirit" of this aspiration fund is still alive and maintained 
in the local budgeting process. The research resultsprovided an 
understanding that the mechanism of "public aspiration fund" is used as 
one of the mechanisms of budget allocation by local governments. In this 
case the allocation is an integral part of regional budget which is then 
implemented in the program and budgeting of the Local Government 
Unit. 
Some facts indicate that the funds on behalf of public needsand 
social interests became a ‘plowing’ sources of budgeting actors, such as 
the alleged misuse of funds aspirations in Jeneponto reached Rp55 billion 
in 2012 (Tribunnews.Com). Cases of alleged deviation of social aid 
funds of the government in South Sulawesi Province in 2008.The total 
expenditures of the social aid funds amounting Rp151,5 billion, of which 
approximately Rp149.9 billion social aids for social organization and 
regional secretary of South Sulawesi Province (CPC 2009). Based on 
data from the Ministry of Home Affairs in the last ten years (from 2004 
to 2014) there were 3,169 members of parliament (DPR), 325 regents 
were allegedly involved in corruption cases. In addition there were 1,221 
civil servants who were also involved in corruption 
(www.republika.co.id). This phenomenon shows that the legislative and 
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executive in interaction can only make budget policy in maintaining a 
positive sense of self, maintaininf their ego, and preserving self-esteem. 
Theatrical exploration in interaction of the local budgets actors in 
this research is to gain a unique perspective onlocal budgeting dynamics. 
Through an understanding of narcissism, this study explores the 
involvement of local budget actors in "identity game", how the public 
aspiration funds show a reality on public welfare policy partiality as the 
"holy" goal of local budgeting. 
 
Public Aspiration Funds and Regional Budgeting Politic 
Posner and Park (2007) stated that legislative authority on public 
funds has become the basis for budgeting and public accountability in the 
budget development proposed by executive. The basic power of 
legislative appropriation shows formative influence in allocating funds in 
various priority levels. Legislative influence over the executive was 
strengthened by implementation of supervision over the budget 
implementation and management. The role played by the legislature 
actually very spacious, among others are political forces, law and 
institutions as well as internal legislative structures and processes 
changeable by the legislative itself. 
Over the last two decades The role of legislative in public policy 
making and budgeting is getting increased (Schick, 2001). Using case 
studies on four agencies, Johnson (1994) found that bureaucracy 
responded to the pressure exerted by the legislature in the process of 
budget and policy making. Hyde &Shafritz (1978) in Abdullah and 
Asmara (2006) stated that budgeting is a legislative process. Whatever 
the executive made in the budgeting process would ultimately depend on 
the legislature because the legislature has the power to ratify or reject 
proposed budgets of executive. 
Dobell and Ulrich (2002) stated that the important role of legislative 
is to represent public interests, empowering government and supervise 
the performance of government. The three roles putlegislature be capable 
of providing significant influence on government policy. Meanwhile, 
according to Havens (1996), there is no requirement for the legislative to 
have the same preferences with the government on policy, including the 
budget. Samuels (2000) mentions two possible changes the legislative 
can make toward proposed budget of the executive: the first is to change 
the budget amount and the second isto changeexpenditure distribution or 
expenditure in the budget. Following the order of legislative power be 
generally applied, several possibilities could occur are: 
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(1) The legislature cannot increase spending or the deficit, but 
can decrease spending or raise revenue; (2) the legislature 
requires Presidential approval before final passage to increase 
spending; (3) the legislature cannot increase the deficit, but can 
increase spending if increases revenue; and (4) the legislature 
can increase or decrease spending or revenue without restriction. 
 
Division of constitutional responsibilities between executive and 
legislature has a great impact on the legislative-executive role in 
budgeting. Budget structure has effect on the role played by the 
legislature in budget process. With regard to the scope of legislative 
authority, according to Wehner (2004) one category of legislative 
influence on budgeting is that legislature has capacity to amend or reject 
the proposed budget of executive and replace them as proposed. 
The management of programs and activities using public 
aspiration funds shows how the dominance of the board members may 
have an impact on accountability, including the impact and quality of 
these activities. According to Posner and Park (2007) the commission 
structure is the heart of legislative influence. Given the complexity and 
technical details in modern budget, the legislature realized the 
importance of task-sharing to review the commission budget. The 
relationship between budget committee and commission is important in 
determining the budget by legislature (Schick, 2002). The level of budget 
changes is one way to assess the influence of legislature on the budget. 
Legislative officials often have informal influence toward 
executive budget before approval. The executive officers have incentive 
to anticipate and take into account the potential for legislative review on 
the accounts and their reactions when developing their proposals, either 
through informal negotiations or anticipatory behavior. Indeed, the 
absence of changes that may reflect bargaining and negotiations between 
the executive and the legislature during the formulation process, if there 
is an effective informal consultation (Posner and Park, 2007). Legislative 
intend to affect the public budget with not only maintain the program and 
priorities for funding, but also how it be "entrusted" through an executive 
agency. 
Provided with expertise and control over the details of the 
program implementation, local governments can gain significant 
influence in re-forming the services actually delivered in the programs 
and activities. In influencing the budget implementation, legislature must 
maintain a balance between supervision function and desire to increase 
efficiency by allowing bureaucrats to manage the program in accordance 
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with the norms and values of professional. Greater legislative 
involvement in budgeting presents important institutional challenges. 
Legislature Is a collegial board and representative institutions of policy 
making. As a political institution, their capacity for collective action is 
often hindered by different parties, either ideology or constituents. The 
legislature will be very responsive toconstituencies and constantly 
challenged to produce a response at high level constituents and take 
responsible action on behalf of the entire society (Meyers, 1999). 
Legislature and rules can assist the deliberation structure and voting to 
balance the frequently competing incentives, but politically can reverse 
when the political change (Shepsle, 1986). 
The strong role of legislative in budgeting raises questions about 
how the role be expanded will influence and in contrary to the objectives 
and budgetary criteria such as: fiscal discipline (Joyce, 2005; Wehner, 
2001), budget allocation, administrative efficiency, and accountability. 
The trade-off occurs between competing objectives. A budget process 
with the closer legislative control will increase the democratic 
accountability but with the potential risk erode the government's 
efficiency or fiscal discipline. Legislative control will depend on factors 
such as the nature of party system, the potential for collaboration and 
cooperation of all governments, the quality and capacity of legislators 
and their staff, and their incentive structures in balancing the potential for 
tension between the response of constituents and effective policy-
making. 
Schick (2002) shows how the role of legislature in budgeting 
gives strong consequences on executive power. Budgeting is potentially 
to restrict the action of legislature. Meanwhile, advance the interests of 
legislature as a priority does not mean that the reformation is a zero sum 
game, where the benefit legislative is the loss of executive. 
The result of this study provides an understanding that public 
aspiration fund is a part of local budgeting mechanism. In this respect the 
public aspiration fund is a compromise through informal mechanisms 
between local authorities through the Local Government Unit (SKPD) of 
South Sulawesi province and theRegional Representative Council 
(DPRD) of South Sulawesi Province through each commission. Political 
cycle of local budgets shows that there are two mechanisms for 
negotiation in bringing together the interests of the executive and 
legislative branches. Budget Agency (Banggar) of DPRD together with 
Local Government Budget Team (TAPD) are in charge of discussing 
more strategic issues such as the discussion of KUA-PPAS proposed by 
local government and jointly prepare the final draft of the financial 
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memorandum and draft of local regulation (Raperda) toward regional 
budget including establishment of the allocation of "public aspiration 
fund" of each member of the board. More technical mechanisms and 
informal is the Commission Meeting together with partners from each 
Local Government Unit (SKPD). 
At the commission meeting with the partners from each SKPD 
conducted "negotiations" about the programs to give fund by the 
aspiration to be "entrusted" on the budget of each SKPD partners.It is the 
point the "conspiracy" about the public aspiration fundsbe conducted. 
According to Davis (1994) the links, connections, partnerships, and 
alliances can serve to provide benefits or greater control. Coalitions are 
often represented as an informal power. In negotiations, it is likely to 
encourage others to make concessions (Cialdini, 1993). Unfortunately, 
the exchange of pleasure, compromise or arrangement of "under-table" 
may be unethical and illegal, or at least may not be the best interests of 
organization. 
 
Public Aspiration Fund in Reality and Symbol Relationship  
According Piliang (2010), reality is like a dynamic geographical 
map emerging in contour richness, surface, terrain, cracks or chips; 
whose elements are always changing, moving, or transforming. So he 
said that reality always revealed his form in a different way. Sometimes 
itappears as alleged, but often alsoin unforeseen circumstances; it does 
not sometimes appears as imagined, but sometimes also appear not as 
imagined. Sometimes it appears in regularities, but often also appears in 
irregular shape. Sometimes it is a reflection of a rational thing, but often 
it becomes a reflection of irrational thing. An object can represent reality 
through the materialdesignation (Piliang, 2012). In this case, the reality 
itself is a reference of sign. However, an object can be a copy, replica, 
mock, or duplication of the reference itself. It becomes an icon of reality, 
simulation. In this case, the difference between the sign and the reference 
is very thin, so it may be said that the sign itself is a reference. It may 
also happen that a sign is not at all referring to a reference or a certain 
reality.Therefore itis itself a fantasy, an illusion, or hallucination that 
changed its form as if it were reality-it is a pseudo-reality, hyper-reality. 
Public aspiration fund is a duplicated reality and then reproduced into a 
model created in the local budgeting policy. Public aspiration fund as a 
social reality at the level of social objectivity is the objectivity based on 
the agreement made by the actors of local budgets. 
Discourse of public aspiration fundas part of local budgeting 
reality provides an understanding that public aspiration fund was 
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"created" by actors of local budgets and had become part of the "game" 
in the political cycle of local budgets. Giddens action theory states that 
individual actor as a member of a culture is skillful and knowledgeable of 
the culture. They "know how to play the game" (Boland, 1985). This 
means that they do not only capable to talk about things to be done and 
how things are performed in society, but they also have skills to act, 
monitor, and change their actions in certain circumstances which are 
known only by themselves "they know more than they can say." 
Legislative understandsthe public aspiration as (1) a form of 
responsibilityof the council members as a representative of society, (2) 
allneeds of community development that is  nominally represented in the 
local budget (APBD), and (3) one of forms of the political interests that 
aim for the need of equity based on constituency (electoral district) 
council members. The study provides an understanding of how the 
reading of public aspiration funds beinterpreted by the informant as: 
1. Funds of "pork barrel". Particular Pork barrel do not often touch the 
root of the problem existing society, because only segmented to 
specific recipients who may be considered a loyal voters. Pork barrel 
was then inherited in political practice as something that "must" be 
done. The local budget actors who take "part" of the public aspiration 
funds will at the end only bring benefits to themselves and their 
political careers, and not because they believe that the project for 
which they fought really worth it for the benefit of society. 
2. Imaginary political fund. The practice of public aspiration fund has 
been developed into a political image in which the local budgeting 
actors are understood as a savior of society. Political budget cycle is 
shown in the budget posture, increasing spending, and unusual 
transfers. This budget distortion may occur because the politician 
wants to show himself as a good politician who always work hard for 
the benefit of society. 
3. Entrusted fund, "locker". Public aspiration program is proposed by 
council members to be part of local budgets. The funds used in the 
fund aspirations program is considered as "entrusting" owned and 
controlled by the "entruster". Work program and budget on SKPD is 
defined as "locker" or the place where the aspiration fund is placed.  
4. Funds of conspiracy. Conspiracy in the management of public 
aspiration funds has become a part of the culture of "political budget" 
which enjoyed "in share" so that it is more and more difficult to trace 
the impact on society in accordance “holy” purpose of the program or 
the fund aspirations. 
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5. Inspiration and aspiration funds of local budgets actor. The program of 
public aspirations has become the inspiration for the local budget 
actors to aspire a number of public funds to finance the programs or 
activities aimed at public interests, but it was eventually be used as 
part of political incentives and private interests. 
6. Unimpacted funds. Public aspirations fund does not only give effect of 
"shaving mustache". The problem is as if finished after "being shaved" 
but after that it will appear again. Public aspirations fund has not been 
comprehensively felt and not touched the public fundamental interests 
and is considered be only enjoyed by a certain group of people or by 
the budget actors themselves.  
Thus, at the level of discourse, public aspiration fund is used as a 
‘rational’ argument to realize the parliament action to "answer" people's 
desire and fulfillment of "political promises" when campaigning and 
recess activities in electoral districts. At the practical level, public 
aspiration fund "provided by" local budgets as "legitimacy" that public 
aspirationshas been "implemented" through programs or activities in 
each work unit area. Authorization upon the symbol is described as the 
power to createa reality that as if legitimate in nature. The symbolic 
power occurs through the introduction made possible by habitus of work 
as a scheme of perception and appreciation of reality. 
 
 
Public Aspiration Fund: The Mirror and Mask of Local Budget 
Actors 
Amernic and Craig (2010) said that unethical behavior is 
suspected to arise because the organization is very narcissistic (and 
possibly the organization members) through self-obsession, self-
aggrandizement, denial, and rationalization to justify what they are doing 
(Duchon and Drake, 2009). Research of Anderson and Tirrell (2004) 
showed that narcissists of CEO made the choice of accounting policies 
and management decisions and that the existence of extreme narcissism 
may help to explain the company’s decay (Schwartz, 1991). Budget 
accounting has a unique and distinctive feature to encourage the ego and 
improve the behavior of certain budget actors by using the budget 
language and steps as an important instrument in their discourse of 
accountability to the public. It is important for all other stakeholders to 
monitor the language of the budgets actors for signs of narcissists 
including signs provided by the language and budgeting action.  
There is reasonable reason to assume that most actors of local 
budgets show a tendency of narcissist. Kets de Vries (2004) argued that 
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"... a solid dose of narcissism is a prerequisite for anyone who hopes to 
rise to the top of an organization". Competition in regent and legislators 
electionis an intense fighting and "allow individuals of strong narcissistic 
personality to prepare more in doing the difficult process for reaching 
positions of power" (Kets de Vries and Miller, 1985). This view is 
supported Pech and Slade (2007) who stated that narcissists "want a 
higher position" and they can satisfy their desire to gain power through 
legitimacy and adapt to demands of routines and rituals of organization. 
The policy of public aspiration funds in local budgeting has 
shown how legislature creates a symbol that indicates their 
responsibilities as the representativesto fight for public aspirations. 
However, in reality, the public aspiration funds have led to contradictions 
in an effort to serve their interests. Lancan in Piliang (2012) referred to it 
as a structured unconscious just like language structure. Lancan saw that 
as a language phenomenon, unconscious human journey is divided into 
two general phases, namelyimaginary phase and symbolic phase. 
Imaginary is associated with the identification experience of intuitive, 
affective and emotional; a variety of stimuli, as well as conceptual 
thoughts flowing without limit and with overlapping conditions, 
fluctuating, and criss-crossed, before moored permanently on the 
symbolic order. The symbolic order is alienation phase or subject 
splitting, namely the phase of losing part of his reality by identifying 
himself in symbolic order, in the form of a convention or code. Among 
the phases of this imaginary are the phase of mirror image and 
narcissistic identification phase (primary identification), in which the 
subject lives in ambiguous nature. At this narcissistic phase, the subject is 
seeing himself in the mirror with feelings of love due to its beauty, 
although what is seen (signifier) is not the truth (signified)of him.  The 
public aspirations fund is one of the mirror and masks effects in 
budgeting context. 
As part of the implementation of Local Parliament (DPRD) 
function: legislation, oversight, and budgeting, the legislature has the 
power to have a significant impact on budget policy. Such as what is 
called by Castellano and Lightle (2005) as a power manifestation of 
"tone at the top" in financial reformation. The legislature can set the 
"tone at the top" and affect the ethical attitudes through proposing 
program to be considered as the program of netting results of public 
aspirations "romance netting". The council members as "representatives" 
is the public repsentation so it is natural that they are metaphorically 
called "respectable" in projecting themselves. According to Kets de Vries 
and Miller (1985) this behavior is prone to develop the mental models 
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ofthemselves. This is consistent with many behavioral traits of extreme 
narcissism: grandiosity, vanity, fantasies of power and brilliance, search 
of admiration and arrogance and tends to have characteristics of 
destructive narcissism. Destructive narcissism is prone to paranoia and 
tend to maintain "some sort of stability". A leader who has the 
characteristics of a destructive narcissism can split himself as a "good 
representative", engaged in combat with "representatives of evil" (Glad, 
2002). 
Basically the local budget is designed as one of the 
implementations of the government's duty to serve and improve the 
public welfare. Therefore, the real budget is dedicated to the public 
interest. The public aspiration fund isone of the "absorptions" of action of 
local budgets actors to express their careness to the public. However, 
according to Edelman (1967) bureaucratic culture has been encouraging 
to see people as objects of administration, as a so many collection of 
"problems" to be solved, controlled, and improved or remade as a target 
for "social engineering", and generally designed and stored in the 
planned form with violence. The focus is attention to the dramatic 
political developments, but had no effect on welfare. The political 
discourse is usually bringing persons involved in tragic event. 
In the model of organizational identity dynamics, Hatch and 
Schultz (2002) claimed that organization membersconcluded their 
identity based on how they express themselves to others and imaging 
who is in the shadow of self-expressions. Brown (1997) diagnosesthe 
conditions that unwilling or unable to respond to external impression as 
organizational narcissism. Based on the concept of Freud, Brown stated 
that narcissism is a psychological response to the needsof managing 
themselves, while narcissism in organization as a complex psychology 
which consists of denial, rationalization, self-aggrandizement, selfishness 
attribution and anxiety. Narcissism becomes dysfunctional when it 
existsin extreme conditions. 
The narcissistic organizational identityaccording to Hatch and 
Schultz (2002)emerged as a result of indentity and cultural interactionin 
which the feedback of‘mirroring’ process was ignored or even never 
found and no real effort to make communication with all stakeholders. 
The dynamics of dysfunctional identity occurs when the organization 
made a mistake in expressing self-referential (ieculture embedded in 
identity reflection) to be projected to the outside. Christensen and Cheney 
(2000) diagnose this dysfunction as organizational self-absorption and 
self-seduction leading to an "identity game". 
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Sumber: Modificationsandadaptations of Hatch dan Schultz (2002) 
 
Hatch and Schultz (2002) stated that the organization loses a 
point of reference with their organizational culture in evolution stageof 
the image as described by Baudrillard (1994), in his book Simulacra and 
Simulation. In the first stage, the image represents the reality in line with 
the depth of the meaning of image (or sign). In the second stage, the 
image acts as a ‘mask’ to covers the reality hidden beneath the surface. In 
the third stage, the image appears as a ‘mask’ butdoes not exist in reality. 
Finally, in the fourth stage, the image has nothing to do with reality. 
An object can represent reality through the signifier which 
contains a specific meaning or signified. In this case, the reality is a 
reference from the signifier. However, it can also happen that an object 
does not refer to a specific reference or reality, because itis a fantasy or 
hallucination to realize, Baudrillardcalled it as ‘hyper-reality’ (Piliang, 
1998). According to Baudrillard (1994) the era of hyper-reality was 
signified by the disappearance of signifier and metaphysics of 
representation; the collapse of ideologies and reality replaced by 
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duplication of thenostalgia world and fantasy or becomes reality to 
substitute reality, fetish tomissing objects is no longer the object of 
representation, but the ecstasy of denial and annihilation of the ritual 
itself. 
The hyper-reality world is a world loaded by alternation of the 
reproduction of simulacrum objects, objects of purely "sightings", 
deprived from the social reality of his past, or indeed possesses no social 
reality as a reference. In such a world,the subject as consumer is herded 
into "space experience" of hyper-reality experience to alternation of 
"sightings" in the room, mingling and melting of reality with fantasy, 
fiction, hallucinations and nostalgia, so the difference between each other 
is hard to find.In this case, hyper-reality toBaudrillard (1994)emphasizes 
both nostalgia and science fiction. People who are in this era are stuck in 
a state of schizophrenia, to remember them do not need to reflect the 
sign, message, meaning or norms. The populace is treated the 
reproduction of sighting values but not the reproduction of mythological 
or ideological values. The populace is the consumer who absorbsthe 
material values, the values of imaginary or sightings. Local budgeting 
has emerged mirror and mask effects for the involved budget actors. The 
problematic of symbols created by the local budgeting actors through 
discourse of public aspiration fund has opened space to expose the true 
reality behind the symbol. 
 
Discourse and Potential of Local Budget Narcisism 
Local budgeting as a result of social construction shows the 
activity and behavior of local governments that reflect the values and 
social goals. According to Wildavsky (1998) the budget can not be 
separated from society's values. Therefore, he further said that there is a 
need for pragmatic and practical view in looking at the budget to study 
the social and political ideology embraced by a society or government. In 
line with this view, King (2000) argued that the budget can not be 
understood without an understanding on the "context", therefore, Koven 
(1999) in his study did not focus on the numbers in the budget process, 
but he saw some triggers such as politics and power. According to 
Syarifuddin (2009) local budget is the face and the heart of policy-
making actors. "Face", because the budget is something readable by 
anyone and can not be hidden. While the "heart" is a process of upheaval 
like a drama, because the numbers in a budget draft is only a physical 
reality, while the non-physical reality such as spirit, an emotional and 
soul, including the spiritual aspects are only recognizable by the policy 
perpetrators. 
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When local budgeting can not show how the management of 
resources for public welfare, politicians, bureaucrats and legislators will 
seek to influence public perception by shaping the image as if they carry 
out the mandate entrusted by vouters (public). Thus, local budget has the 
potential to accentuate the "hall of mirrors". 
Local budgets can claim rhetorical potency. When exploited by 
the actors of narcissistic budget, this rhetorical potential has power. Local 
budget facilitate the actors of narcissistic budget as part of a social 
expression. Glad (2002) analyzed the narcissist malignancy (political 
tyrants)leading to characteristic of destructive narcissism as a vicious 
circle that makes the "tyrant becomes increasingly isolated from the 
people under leading (Glad, 2002). Budget languagehas strong potential 
to be involved in the cycle by contributing to the isolation of budget 
actors from society. Thus, the abstraction of local budgets provides 
accounting (as a story) to another abstraction that is (metaphoric) of local 
government. 
Public aspiration fund in this study is used as a theme of 
narcissism. According to Kets de Vries (2004) a dose of extreme 
narcissism is a prerequisite for anyone who hopes to rise to the top of the 
organization. In high competition, strong narcissistic personality is more 
preparableto carry out the difficult process to reach powerful 
position.Pech and Slade (2007) argued that narcissists "want a higher 
managerial position" for the satisfaction of gaining power through 
legitimate in corresponding to the demands of ritual organization. 
Narcissism is often referred to as onedimension of personality 
"Machiavellianism triad" (Paulhus and Williams, 2002) with a tendency 
of manipulation, a liar, opportunistic, but be able to attract attention, 
charismatic and pretend to emotion. Political narcissism according to 
Piliang (2009) is the tendency to exaggerated "self workship" of political 
elites, which builds self-image even though it is not the actual self-
reality: "close to the farmer", "underprivileged defender", "familiar with 
the merchants in the market", "cautious leader","guard of nation 
unity","eradication of corruption", or"defenders of nation conscience". 
Political narcissism is the mirror of "political artificialism", through as 
good, smart, intelligent, perfect, and ideal as possible of self-image 
construction, regardless of general view of actual self-reality.  
Local budgeting has broad dimension that encourage local 
government to establish narcissism. Lutus (2007) stated that one of the 
main suppliers of social narcissism is the government. Government 
narcissism relates to how to utilize people in accordance with what they 
need and that the government is in a "moral vacuum". Sometimes a 
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person comes into government with ideas about role and limitations, and 
then creates a program and budget based on personal narcissism in 
opposite to public sentiment. However, such mistaken is considered 
natural, because the public will usually forget it in a short time. The 
failure of social narcissism is demonstrated by inability of government 
policy to fight against the public instincts. However, the success of social 
narcissism is that government comes at the greatest power when the 
public confesses and reinforces the uncivilized desireof individual. The 
Government is successful to attract public collective narcissism while 
personally they only act for concern (Lutus, 2007). 
Local budgeting as a discourse can be observed through language 
use and social relations that exist behind the budgeting process, in which 
the budget actor is speaking, writing and acting in local budgeting. This 
is in line with the notion of discourse by Piliang (2012) that the discourse 
is related to the use of language in certain time and place. The discourse 
is also directly related to social practices and daily life. In language area, 
discourse is defined as "... a certain way of speaking, writing, and 
thinking". Discourse can also be defined as a particular way in drafting 
and acting against social objects, which creates the implication on the 
subject. Itis manifested in social practices and physical composition (or 
structure)as well as in oral and written form. Therefore, discourse formes 
the object and object at the same(Piliang, 2012). 
Local budget that represents "public service" is difficult to use as a 
reference to show the reality that every rupiahof budget has direct and 
indirect contribution to public service and welfare. It can also be seen in 
the budget performance indicators that can only measure the output. 
Whereas, the instructions for the Program Performance and 
Accountability Report (LAKIP) clearly show that activity program 
indicators: output, outcome, and even impact of each activity. In terms of 
format, the budget policy used is indeed the performance-based budget, 
but in the budget organization process, the mind set traditional budgeting 
is still used. In the concept of performance-based budget, local budgets 
should reflect the performance of or report on their success or failure. 
Discourse in local budgeting is not merely the application of the system 
of signs to represent the actors’ behaviors in local budgeting and 
planning.  Piliang (2012) stated that although the discourse covering the 
signs and semiotics, but it is also associated with other relationships 
inherent in the discourse beyond signing system. One of those relations, 
as proposed by Foucault, is power relation that behind the pronunciation 
or disclosure, behind the setting of space and objects, behind the use of 
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body and pleasure, there is a form of powerthat operates and determines 
the existence and the shape. 
 
Conclusions, Implications, and Research Limitations 
Conclusion 
Narcissism in local budgeting can be observed through a search 
on "public aspiration funds" created by the actor of local budgeting and 
as a form of local budgeting dynamics to shape identities attached to 
legislators as elected representatives or bureaucrats to serve the peoples. 
Public aspiration funds become "exspression" of local budgeting culture 
as a "physical" form of the service interests and public welfare.  
The study also gains an understanding that when the identity 
becomes  a "motive" to obtain the benefit of "private" or "certain groups" 
on behalf of the public, the aspiration funds have then been used as a 
means of "impression" that they are "as if" concerned with the public. 
Thus the public aspiration fund isnotlongerthe reality but it has become 
narcissism of political budgeting as a "mirror" that Piliang (2009) called 
it as "politics of seduction’. Aspiration funds have "disconnected" from 
their cultural roots (loss of culture). 
 
Implication 
At the practical level the mechanism of aspiration fund that was 
previously intended as fund allocation for legislative members in 
accordance with constituency has indeed become a local budgeting 
culture that tend to be manipulative.  
As policy implications, the aspiration fund is a part of totalityby 
design of entire budgeting process. The practice so far shows that the 
level of accountability and transparency of public aspiration fund 
managementis very low, because the amount of aspiration fund allocation 
is unknown and only a part of "negotiation" between the local 
government and local Parliament (DPRD) through each device and their 
fittings. 
The theoretical implication of this study indicates that local 
budgeting is not only observed in behavioral context, but can be 
developed in a broader perspective to observe the psychological, social, 
and politics impacts.  
 
Limitations and Research Agenda for Future 
The limitations of this study include: first, the selection of 
existing signs in local budgeting associated with the tendency of 
narcissism. This study only selectedpublic aspiration funds as ahyper-
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signifier. The analysis of texts or signs with semiotic approach can use all 
texts created and established in local budgeting. Future research can 
develop various signs that are produced in local budgeting, such as social 
aids, grant for the poor, free education, free health care and focus their 
study on these signs.  
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